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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Recently the topic of conductive argument has attracted more and more attention 
from argumentation scholars. Based on a careful reading, and some critical 
development, of Carl Wellman’s ideas of “conduction” and “conductive”, many 
scholars are apt to take conductive argument as a new and important type of 
argument. The best example, also the representative pattern, of Conductive 
Argument is an argument whose conclusion is drawn non-conclusively from both 
positive and negative considerations. This is a distinctive type of argument, 
according to many of its advocates, because there is no other type of argument 
which explicitly takes into account the negative considerations, and thereby 
indicates that the conclusion is reached in a way of weighing and balancing.  
However, this promising view of conductive argument has been challenged 
by Jonathan Adler, in his last paper on the journal of Argumentation. From an 
epistemological point of view, Adler seriously doubts that we could really have the 
conductive argument understood in the above way. His arguments in that paper are 
now critically examined by J. Anthony Blair, who tries to reveal that Adler’s criticism 
is based on some misunderstanding of conductive argument. 
 
2. ARGUING ABOUT CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENT 
 
Adler agrees that many of our public issues are indeed controversial, or unsettled at 
the present time, so they have “the evident pro-con nature” (Alder, 2013, p.4), that is, 
when we think about them, and when we try to argue for some view on these issues, 
we do need to consider both reasons for and reasons against our claim. Therefore, 
“Conductive Arguments are not new; what is new is their recognition, their critical 
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examination, and the discussions of explicit roles they are called to play” (ibid.). 
However, he disagrees with most of advocates of conductive argument, on their 
ways of defining this type of argument. Because he believes that they have wrongly 
characterized conductive argument with two incompatible properties:  
 
(1)  the argument itself is inconclusive, since the counter-
considerations are regarded as being able to continue to diminish the 




(2)  the conclusion of the argument is supposed to be accepted as 
true or acceptable without qualification, thus it could issue in belief.  
 
Adler contends that these two characterizations are indeed conflicting, since 
if the conclusion is to be accepted as true or acceptable, then the undermining 
reasons must not remain viable. 
From an epistemological point of view, Adler argues that only conclusive 
arguments whose premises provide sufficient support can render their conclusions 
acceptable without qualification, and then yield our belief in conclusion in such a 
way that we could “separate the accepted conclusion from the premises that settled 
its truth”. (Alder, 2013, p.5) He terms this phenomenon detachment, or entitlement 
to detach, which “reflects that inquiry on the matter is ended - all relevant 
considerations are weighed in”. (ibid.) Detachment, according to Adler, is not 
possible for all the inconclusive arguments, whose conclusions have to be reached 
with qualification, for there still remain relevant evidences to be accommodated.  
As a result, conductive argument cannot have both of the above properties: if 
it is inconclusive, it must have its conclusion qualified; or, if it renders conclusion 
acceptable and issues belief, it has to be conclusive, by nullifying all the counter-
considerations. Characterizing conductive argument with those two properties at 
the same time would just make the understanding of conductive argument 
paradoxical, and its existence impossible. 
Blair assessed Adler’s analysis and he disagrees. As his first criticism, Blair 
points out that Adler has misunderstood the views of (most of) the proponents of 
conductive arguments, especially, their ways of unpacking the meaning of 
inconclusive. According to Blair, Alder has wrongly taken it to mean that conductive 
arguments “are non-conclusive in the sense that their conclusions are not detached 
from their premises, but always remain qualified by the acknowledged counter-
considerations”. (Blair, 2013, p.6) While, unfortunately, a careful reading of the 
works of Wellman, Govier, and other proponents of conductive argument will just 
prove this surmise to be simply false. As Blair has shown,  
 
for Wellman, conductive reasoning and arguments are inconclusive in the sense that 
they are not subject to deductive closure (Blair, 2013, p. 5) 
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for Govier, the premises of conductive arguments do not supply conclusive support 
for their conclusions in the sense that those premises do not entail those 
conclusions. (ibid.) 
and 
conductive arguments are non-conclusive, for Pinto, just in the respect that they are 
defeasible and in that respect they are unlike deductively valid arguments. (Blair, 
2013, p. 6) 
 
Therefore, Blair contends, “Adler simply mistakes what those theorists mean 
by ‘non-conclusive.’ There seems, on close examination, to be no incompatibility 
between Adler’s position and that of the proponents of conductive arguments.” 
(ibid.)  
 For his second criticism, Blair carefully examines many other views of the 
authors of chapters in Conductive Argument, the book Adler cited in writing his 
paper. His finding is that almost no one has held the view that the conclusion of 
conductive argument is non-detachable (James Freeman, arguably, might be the 
only exception). So they are “not committed, by virtue of Adler’s argument, to the 
view that conductive arguments are not possible” (Blair, 2013, p. 9). It appears as 
though Adler himself is committing a straw man fallacy, refuting a seemingly 
inconsistent view that no one really has. As his final verdict, Blair concludes, 
  
[Adler’s] objection to the possibility of conclusion-detached conductive arguments 
when these are defined as, among other things, non-conclusive, is based on a 
misunderstanding of the way ‘non-conclusive’ is used by many, if not most, of the 
proponents of conductive reasoning and argument. So conductive arguments are, 
after all, possible - at least if Adler has identified the only reason for thinking that 
they are not.(Blair, 2013, p. 9) 
  
3. ADLER’S OBJECTION AGAIN 
 
Does Blair make a good case against Adler’s objections on conductive argument? We 
believe he does. Alder detects two incompatible properties (i.e. being inconclusive 
and establishing the truth/acceptance of conclusion) which are supposed to be 
characteristic of conductive argument. But, as Blair has pointed out in such a clear 
way with solid evidence, since no one really understands one of them (inconclusive) 
in the way Adler has in mind, the incompatibility turns out to be illusive.  
However, is Adler’s critique then to be completely dismissed? Is there really 
nothing incompatible in current understanding of conductive argument that would 
turn the impossibility of its existence? We think the answer remains to be vague.  
Adler could have formulated his arguments in a better way, to avoid the 
using of and the interpreting of the term inconclusive, which result his being guilty of 
misunderstanding. He is attracted by the frequent uses of “inconclusive” by others. 
And he hastily assumes it to be “a term for expressing the conviction that in 
Conductive Arguments there are un-eliminated or unreduced, even if outweighed, 
counter-considerations” (Alder, 2013, p.7), while unluckily all the others in fact take 
it to mean “non-deductive” or “defeasible”.  
Regardless of the fact that Adler does misunderstand the others’ uses and 
meanings of inconclusive, let’s try to think the issue in another way around: whether 
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the others have indeed attributed conductive arguments with a characterization 
that Alder has referred to by his wrong use of the term inconclusive? We believe they 
have, since for almost all of them, counter-considerations, though outweighed, are 
still seen to be remaining viable, and are treated as premises providing reasons 
relevant to the strength of argument. It is nearly the same as the property that Adler 
has attributed to conductive arguments with “inconclusive”. It, as Blair himself has 
identified, consists in “their counter-considerations continuing to carry force and to 
weaken the argument even after the conclusion has been drawn”. (Blair, 2013, p.2) 
Consequently, the incompatibility that Adler has detected might still be there in 
their ways of characterizing conductive argument.  
As Adler has clarified, “the claim that I dispute is that once the conclusion is 
drawn, the counter-considerations continue to diminish its support” (Adler, 2013, p. 
4), and his “main and final conclusion” is “that counter-considerations must be 
nullified if there is to be acceptance of the conclusion.” (ibid. p. 7) To argue for these 
claims, he explains at length the mechanism of detachment, and he strives to defend 
that if the conclusion of conductive argument could be rendered acceptable or 
accepted to be true (i.e. detachable), the counter-considerations must have already 
been nullified. As Blair’s survey of views in Conductive Argument has confirmed to 
us, nearly everyone has held the view that the conclusion of conductive argument is 
detachable while none of the outweighed counter-considerations needs to be 
nullified. So here comes the incompatibility that Adler really has in mind, which has 
nothing to do with the different meaning and uses of the term inconclusive. 
Accordingly, another version of Adler’s argument against conductive 
argument, in our reading, runs as follows: 
 
1.  When our argument is cogent, meeting whatever conditions are necessary 
for a successful argument, the claim in conclusion can be reasonably accepted, and 
then yield belief in the claim legitimately. 
 
2.  Within a cogent argument, we can separate the accepted conclusion from the 
premises that settled its truth, which represents an end of inquiry (till now) into 
whether the claim in conclusion holds or not. 
 
3.  An inquiry on some matter could be ended only when all relevant 
considerations (available at the present time) have been weighed in.  
 
4. When all the relevant considerations have been weighed in, a definite view 
could be reached and asserted, which means, and requires, that the reasons in 
favour of it have been considered to be sufficiently strong to outweigh the reasons 
against it, otherwise the inquiry on the matter remains to be open and no definite 
view can be asserted without qualification. 
 
5.  When reasons against a claim are outweighed, their function and role in the 
inquiry of the claim are then nullified; as a result, they are no longer of (negative) 
consequence, and become irrelevant, in the establishment of that claim. Why? 
Because  
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when one belief is settled favourable by the evidence, the disfavoured belief 
evaporates, since it has been determined to be false….the favouring of one belief 
over a conflicting one can only occur if the counter-considerations, the reasons in 
favour of the conflicting beliefs, are nullified. Previously conflicting reasons must 
lose force. (Adler, 2013, p.10) 
 
6.  It is incompatible, in our inquiry, to reach or assert a definite claim without 
qualification, while at the same time to retain the force and relevance of reasons 
which have already been outweighed.  
 
7.  A conductive argument, as characterized by many of its proponents, just 
embodies this incompatibility: the conclusion is supposed to be established (as 
acceptable) without qualification, while the outweighed counter-considerations are 
still regarded to be retaining their force and relevance in establishing the conclusion.  
 
 This argument could still be challenged, especially for some of its premises 
which simply involve controversies in the field of epistemology. But that is not our 
concern here, though we would like to see how the proponents of conductive 
argument would respond.  
 
4. WHY ARGUE CONDUCTIVELY? 
 
There are some more points in Adler’s objections which we find very interesting, 
and would like to expand a little.  
Conductive argument (of its third pattern) is regarded as a distinctive type, 
because there is no other type of argument which explicitly collects both affirmative 
and negative reasons bearing on the conclusion into a single structure, and thereby 
indicates that the conclusion is reached in a way of weighing and balancing. It seems 
to be very common in our argumentative practices, for in many occasions and on 
many issues, together with providing reasons supporting our conclusion, we do 
explicitly mention or acknowledge those reasons against it. It is particularly 
indicated by linguistic clues such as “although,” “even though,” “notwithstanding,” 
and “nevertheless”. 
 However, Alder’s objections are addressed to this distinctiveness of 
conductive argument: weighing and balancing. Can we argue for a definite or certain 
conclusion, while at the same time are still inquiring on whether it is definite or 
certain, i.e. are still in the process of weighing and balancing reasons for and against 
it? It appears as though there is some sort of incompatibility within conductive 
argument. The conclusions of an argument are always definite and certain, at least 
in the arguer’s mind before he/she starts to construct his/her argument, otherwise 
it is not arguing, for there is nothing to be argued. Maybe in that case we are only 
thinking about or reflecting on the matter, hence conductive arguments are not 
arguments at all. 
 If conductive argument cannot be characterized as representing a process of 
weighing and balancing, it could be characterized as representing the product of 
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weighing and balancing. That is, the conclusion argued in conductive argument is a 
definite or certain one, and characteristically, it is a weighed and balanced 
conclusion. The conclusion is the result of an ended inquiry on the matter, and the 
argument is a retrospective reconstruction of the finished process of weighing and 
balancing. But, Alder wants to inform us, the ending of a process of weighing and 
balancing not only terminates inquiry and reaches a certain view, it also settles the 
support for the view in a fixed maximal amount, and nullifies the force and 
relevance of all the counter-considerations on altering the amount of support. 
Therefore, again there seems to be some sort of incompatibility within conductive 
argument. The outweighed counter-considerations can no longer be used as reasons 
against the conclusion, if the conclusion has already been a weighed and balanced 
conclusion, because their force and relevance have already been counted in and 
overridden before the argument is made.  
 It is a matter of fact that outweighed counter-considerations are frequently 
used in argumentative practices, especially in the alleged conductive argument (of 
its third pattern). What is their role and function? Adler clearly denies that they are 
used as reasons against the conclusion, and he furthers backed his view by 
contending that their uses are indeed for rhetorical concerns, indicating or 
manifesting that “the arguer is not subject to familiar biases like one-sidedness” 
(Adler, 2013, p.3). However, proponents of conductive arguments insist that their 
uses are for logical concerns; they function as negative reasons, premises, 
qualification……and the analysis and evaluation of the strength of conductive 
argument have to take them into consideration. How can we decide who is right 
about this? We think the judgment can only be made after a careful examination of 
the pragmatics of linguistic expressions like “although…”, “even though…”, 
“notwithstanding…”, and “nevertheless…”, revealing the real communicative 
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